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Facility Guidance for Control of Carbapenem-
Resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE)
November 2015 Update 
This document updates CDC’s Guidance for Control of Carbapenem-resistant 
Enterobacteriaceae (CRE): 2012 CRE Toolkit. Unless otherwise specified, the term 
healthcare facility refers to all acute care hospitals and any long-term care facility that 
has patients who remain overnight and regularly require medical or nursing care (e.g., 
maintenance of indwelling devices, intravenous injections, wound care, etc.). This 
includes all long-term acute care hospitals and nursing homes providing skilled nursing or 
rehabilitation services, but generally excludes assisted living facilities and nursing homes that 
do not provide more than long-term custodial care. In addition, this toolkit
is not intended for use in ambulatory care facilities. 
Control of resistant organisms is a national problem and requires that facilities that share 
patients work together to prevent transmission. These efforts may be best coordinated by 
local public health. Facilities are strongly encouraged to participate in these regional efforts. 
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The Following Major Items Have Changed from the 2012
CRE Toolkit: 
1. The CDC CRE surveillance definition has been modified. 
2. The two intervention tiers have been replaced by a single tier. Not all interventions 
might be applicable in all settings or situations. Information is provided about 
situations in which specific interventions might be most important. 
3. Further discussion has been added on the use of Contact Precautions in post-acute 
settings. 
4. Information on regional interventions has been removed in order to target this 
document specifically to facilities. Coordinated regional approaches to prevent 
infections with multidrug-resistant organisms remain important; additional 
information on these approaches will be made available in other documents. 
5. Inter-facility communication has been added to the interventions. 
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The emergence and dissemination 
of carbapenem resistance among 
Enterobacteriaceae in the United States 
represents a serious threat to public health. 
These organisms cause infections that are 
associated with high mortality rates and 
they have the potential to spread widely. 
Decreasing the impact of these organisms 
will require a coordinated effort involving 
all stakeholders including healthcare 
facilities and providers, public health, and 
industry. This document updates the 2012 
CRE Toolkit and will continue to evolve 
as new information becomes available. 
The current recommended approach to 
control transmission of these organisms in 
healthcare facilities includes the following: 
•	 Recognizing these organisms as 

epidemiologically important
 
•	 Quantifying the magnitude of CRE 

within the facility and regionally
 
•	 Identifying colonized and infected 

patients when present in healthcare 

facilities
 
•	 Implementing interventions designed 
to stop the transmission of these 
organisms 
Background
 
CRE are Epidemiologically 
Important for Several Reasons: 
•	 Invasive infections (e.g., 
bloodstream infections) caused
by CRE have been associated with 
high mortality rates (up to 40
to 50% in some studies). 
•	 In addition to β-lactam/ 
carbapenem resistance, CRE 
often carry genes that confer high 
levels of resistance to many other 
antimicrobials, often leaving very 
limited therapeutic options. “Pan­
resistant” CRE have been reported. 
•	 CRE have spread throughout 
most parts of the United States 
and other countries and have the 
potential to spread more widely. 
•	 Currently in the United States, 
CRE are primarily identified 
among patients with healthcare 
exposure, but there is potential 
for CRE to spread outside of 
healthcare settings, given that 
Enterobacteriaceae are a common 
cause of community-associated 
infections. 
Carbapenem resistance among 
Enterobacteriaceae can be due to several 
different mechanisms. Some CRE possess 
a β-lactamase (e.g., AmpC or extended-
spectrum β-lactamase (ESBL)) which, 
when combined with porin mutations, 
can render an organism nonsusceptible 
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to carbapenems. Some CRE possess a 
carbapenemase (carbapenemase-producing 
CRE or CP-CRE) that directly breaks 
down carbapenems. Carbapenemases are 
often contained on mobile genetic elements 
that facilitate transfer of resistance among 
Enterobacteriaceae and other gram-negative 
organisms. CP-CRE were first identified in 
the United States from an isolate collected 
in 1996 and have disseminated widely since 
that time. All but two states (ID and ME) 
have reported at least one CP-CRE to the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
as of November 2015. The rapid spread 
of CP-CRE have made these organisms a 
particularly important target for prevention. 
Much of the increase in CRE since 2000 
has been due to the spread of CRE that 
produce the carbapenemase Klebsiella 
pneumoniae Carbapenemase (KPC). In 
addition to KPC, several other types of 
carbapenemases have been identified in the 
United States since 2009. These include the 
New Delhi Metallo-β-lactamase (NDM), 
Verona Integron-encoded Metallo-β­
lactamase (VIM), Oxacillinase-48-type 
carbapenemases (OXA-48), and the 
Imipenemase (IMP) Metallo-β-lactamase. 
Organisms producing these non-KPC 
enzymes are more common in some areas of 
the world; in the United States, they have 
generally been found among patients who 
received medical care in countries where 
organisms with these carbapenemases are 
known to be present. Beginning in 2012, 
however, NDM has been increasingly 
reported among U.S. patients without a 
recent history of exposure to healthcare 
outside of the United States. More recently, 
Klebsiella pneumoniae 
reports of Enterobacteriaceae producing 
OXA-48-type enzymes have also increased 
in the United States. 
The current U.S. distribution of CRE (both 
CP-CRE and non-CP-CRE) appears to be 
heterogeneous; these organisms are more 
commonly isolated from patients in some 
parts of the United States, but they are not 
regularly found in other regions. Even in 
areas where CRE are found they may be 
more commonly present among patients in 
some healthcare settings, such as long-term 
acute care hospitals, than they are in others. 
Healthcare facilities should work with 
public health to have an awareness of their 
regional CRE epidemiology; understanding 
this information can help inform CRE 
prevention efforts. 
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Interventions to control CRE are evolving 
as more data and experience become 
available. Since these organisms currently 
are primarily isolated from people with 
healthcare exposures and the bulk of 
transmission appears to occur in these 
settings, interventions have primarily 
included identifying people colonized or 
infected with CRE while in healthcare 
settings and applying interventions designed 
to minimize the risk of transmission. 
The specific interventions are described 
in detail in the next sections. Although 
the interventions described in the next 
sections are applicable to most healthcare 
settings and most organisms meeting the 
CRE defintion, facilities may choose to 
target some of the interventions to certain 
situations (e.g., outbreaks) and certain types 
of CRE (e.g., CP-CRE). 
CRE Definitions 
In general, CRE are Enterobacteriaceae 
that are nonsusceptible (i.e., intermediate 
or resistant) to a carbapenem. However, 
as described above, carbapenem 
nonsusceptibility among Enterobacteriaceae 
can be acquired through several different 
mechanisms, with carbapenemase 
production currently being the most 
concerning resistance mechanism. 
Differentiating CP-CRE from CRE that are 
nonsusceptible to carbapenems due to other 
mechanisms is complicated by a number 
of issues, including the wide variability 
in the capacity of U.S. clinical and public 
health laboratories to perform testing for 
the detection of carbapenemases. Only 
one test for carbapenemase production, 
the Modified Hodge Test (MHT), is 
currently widely used in U.S. laboratories. 
Although MHT has demonstrated good 
sensitivity for KPC, it has lower sensitivity 
for other carbapenemases, such as 
NDM. In addition, MHT is not specific 
for carbapenemase production among 
some genera of Enterobacteriaceae (e.g., 
Enterobacter). Several other methods 
for detecting carbapenemases have been 
developed, including polymerase chain 
reaction and the Carba NP test, but these 
are not currently widely used in clinical 
laboratories in the United States. Thus, 
a definition that differentiates CP-CRE 
from non CP-CRE based on the organism’s 
pattern of susceptibiltiy to antimicrobials 
(phenotypic definition) would have utility 
for surveillance and prevention. 
However, developing a phenotypic 
definition for CRE that differentiates 
CP-CRE from non-CP-CRE has been 
difficult because the antimicrobial 
susceptibility profiles of these two groups 
overlap. The CRE definition included in 
the 2012 CRE Toolkit (nonsusceptible 
to imipenem, meropenem, or doripenem 
and resistant to all third-generation 
cephalosporins tested) was designed to be 
more specific for CP-CRE; however, it was 
a complicated definition that has proven 
difficult to implement. Further, based on 
an assessment of the antibiograms of CRE 
isolates submitted to CDC from six U.S. 
metropolitan areas, that definition missed 
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 a portion of KPC-producing CRE. In 
addition, that definition has the potential 
to miss some CRE producing OXA-48­
type carbapenemases, since these isolates 
might remain susceptible to third generation 
cephalosporins and a number of OXA-48­
type-producing CRE evaluated at CDC 
have only been resistant to one carbapenem 
(ertapenem). 
In an attempt to simplify the CRE 
definition as well as further increase the 
ability of the definition to identify CRE 
that produce carbapenemases, CDC has 
refined the 2012 interim CRE surveillance 
definition: 
CRE are Enterobacteriaceae that are: 
•	 Resistant to any carbapenem 
antimicrobial (i.e., minimum 
inhibitory concentrations of ≥4 
mcg/ml for doripenem, meropenem, 
or imipenem OR ≥2 mcg/ml for 
ertapenem) 
OR 
•	 Documented to produce 

carbapenemase
 
In addition: 
•	 For bacteria that have intrinsic 
imipenem nonsusceptibility (i.e., 
Morganella morganii, Proteus spp., 
Providencia spp.), resistance to 
carbapenems other than imipenem is 
required. 
•	 At present, acceptable tests for 
detecting carbapenemases include 
polymerase chain reaction, MHT, 
Carba NP, metallo-β-lactamase 
testing (e.g., MBL tests or screens). 
As described above, the MHT 
does have limitations including 
over-calling the presence of 
carbapenemases among Enterobacter 
species and failing to identify 
some CRE that produce an NDM 
enzyme; it is included among the 
acceptable tests at this time because 
of its wide use. The number of 
available tests for carbapenemase 
is expanding; facilities using a test 
not included on the list above 
should review the test performance 
to ensure that it has reasonable 
sensitivity and specificity. 
The above phenotypic definition lacks 
specificity for CP-CRE (i.e., CRE that do 
not produce a carbapenemase will often 
meet this definition), especially in areas 
where CP-CRE are rare. Therefore, to guide 
prevention efforts, clinical and public health 
laboratories with the capacity to perform 
carbapenem resistance mechanism testing 
are encouraged to test for the presence of 
carbapenemases. Ideally, U.S. laboratories 
should test for the presence of KPC, 
NDM, and OXA-48-type carbapenemases. 
However, if CRE are identified from a 
geographical area where other types of 
carbapenemases are known to be common 
or if the patient has relevant risk factors 
(e.g., travel outside the United States, 
exposure to non-KPC carbapenemases), 
then testing for other carbapenemases 
should be considered. 
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Facility-Level CRE Prevention 
Surveillance 
Healthcare facilities should be aware of 
whether or not CRE have been isolated 
from patients admitted to their facility. In 
addition, facilities should know whether 
or not their laboratories have the capacity 
to perform carbapenemase testing and 
CRE screening tests. If these tests are not 
available, facilities should identify outside 
laboratories that can perform this testing 
when needed. 
Facilities should consider performing 
ongoing evaluations to quantify the 
incidence of CRE organisms from clinical 
specimens, such as reviewing archived 
laboratory results to determine the number 
and/or proportion of Enterobacteriaceae 
that are CRE over a pre-specified time 
period (e.g., 6 to 12 months). In addition, 
facilities should consider collecting 
information on the basic epidemiology of 
patients colonized or infected with these 
organisms in order to understand common 
characteristics of these individuals. This 
might include patient demographics, dates 
of admission, outcomes, medications, and 
common exposures (e.g., wards, surgery, 
procedures, transfer from other healthcare 
facilities, etc.) 
Facility-Level Prevention Strategies 
The following briefly summarizes 
interventions recommended to prevent 
CRE transmission in healthcare settings. 
The listed interventions might be 
applied differently by facilities based on 
the underlying epidemiology of CRE 
in the region including the regional 
prevalence, the underlying CRE resistance 
mechanisms found in the area, and the 
type of healthcare facility involved. In 
general, standard interventions designed 
to prevent the transmission of multidrug­
resistant organisms (MDROs) (e.g., hand 
hygiene, Contact Precautions) should be 
implemented for most CRE (CP-CRE 
and non-CP-CRE). However, facilities 
might choose to apply a wider range of 
interventions for CRE they judge to be 
epidemiologically important, including all 
CP-CRE. Some non-CP-CRE might also 
be targeted for more extensive interventions 
particularly during an outbreak or if the 
underlying prevalence of the organism is 
high or increasing despite the application of 
baseline prevention measures. The situations 
where each intervention might be most 
useful are specified more completely in the 
next section. For more in-depth review 
of MDRO prevention, please refer to the 
CDC HICPAC guidelines “Management 
of Multidrug-Resistant Organisms in 
Healthcare Settings, 2006” (http://www.cdc. 
gov/hicpac/mdro/mdro_toc.html). 
If carbapenemase testing is not available, 
facilities should consider the possibility 
that any CRE that meets the phenotypic 
surveillance definition is a CP-CRE and 
apply the interventions, as described below, 
accordingly. However, facilities that have 
information on the epidemiology of CRE 
in their region might choose to tailor the 
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range of interventions they apply based on 
these data. For all MDRO control efforts, 
facilities should work together and with 
state and local health departments in order 
to maximize the effect of the interventions 
regionally. 
1. Hand Hygiene 
Hand hygiene is a primary part of preventing 
MDRO transmission. Facilities should 
ensure that healthcare personnel are familiar 
with proper hand hygiene technique as well 
as its rationale. Efforts should be made to 
promote staff ownership of hand hygiene 
using techniques like developing local (e.g., 
unit) hand hygiene champions. Further, 
having policies that require hand hygiene 
is not enough; hand hygiene adherence 
should be monitored and adherence rates 
communicated directly to front line staff. 
Immediate feedback should be provided 
to staff who miss opportunities for hand 
hygiene. In addition, facilities should ensure 
access to adequate hand hygiene stations 
(i.e., clean sinks and/or alcohol-based hand 
rubs) and ensure they are well stocked with 
supplies (e.g., towels, soap) and clear of 
clutter. Further information on hand hygiene 
is available at www.cdc.gov/handhygiene/. 
This intervention is a fundamental part of 
infection prevention practice and should be 
applied for all CRE. 
2. Contact Precautions 
The following two sub-sections describe the 
use of Contact Precautions by healthcare 
setting type based on the type of care 
provided. The third section outlines general 
guidance for any facility using Contact 
Precautions. 
a. Acute Care Hospitals and High-
Acuity Post-Acute Care Settings 
Acute care hospitals, long-term acute care 
hospitals, and ventilator units of skilled 
nursing facilities should generally place 
patients who are colonized or infected 
with CRE on Contact Precautions. Some 
facilities might chose to not place some non-
CP-CRE that remain susceptible to other 
antimicrobials on Contact Precautions. All 
patients with CP-CRE should be placed on 
Contact Precautions. 
Proper Use of Contact 
Precautions Includes: 
•	 Performing hand hygiene before 
donning a gown and gloves 
•	 Donning gown and gloves before 
entering the affected patient’s room 
•	 Removing the gown and gloves and 
performing hand hygiene prior to 
exiting the affected patient’s room 
b. Lower-acuity Post-acute Care Settings 
In lower-acuity post-acute care settings 
(e.g., non-ventilator units of skilled nursing 
facilities, rehabilitation facilities), the use 
of Contact Precautions is more challenging 
and should be guided by the potential risk 
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that residents will serve as a source for 
additional transmission based on their 
functional and clinical status and the type 
of care activity that is being performed. 
For example, Contact Precautions should 
be considered for residents colonized or 
infected with CRE, particularly CP-CRE, 
who are ventilator-dependent (even if 
not in a ventilator unit), are incontinent 
of stool that is difficult to contain, have 
draining secretions or draining wounds that 
cannot be controlled. When using Contact 
Precautions, healthcare personnel (HCP) 
should adhere to the procedures outlined in 
the section above. For other residents with 
CRE (CP-CRE or non-CP-CRE) who are 
able to perform hand hygiene, contain their 
stool and secretions, and are less dependent 
on HCP for their activities of daily living, 
use of gowns and gloves should be based 
on the type of care provided. This consists 
of using gowns and/or gloves when there 
is potential for exposure to their fluids or 
secretions or there is a risk of the healthcare 
provider contaminating their clothes, etc. 
Examples of when gowns and/or gloves 
might be used include the following: 
•	 Bathing residents 
•	 Assisting residents with toileting 
•	 Changing residents’ briefs 
•	 Changing a wound dressing 
•	 Manipulating patient devices
(e.g., urinary catheter) 
Gowns and gloves might not be needed 
if there is minimal potential for cross-
contamination from residents or their 
environment (e.g., setting a tray down 
in the room, entering the room without 
contacting the resident or their immediate 
environment). In addition, residents with 
CRE at lower risk for transmission (as 
described above) do not need to be restricted 
from common gatherings in the facility 
(e.g., meals, group activities). Further work 
is needed to define the risk of contamination 
of HCP hands and clothing with the range 
of activities performed in these settings. 
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 c. All Healthcare Facilities that Use
Contact Precautions 
Systems should be in place to identify 
patients with a history of CRE colonization 
or infection at admission so that they 
can be placed on Contact Precautions. In 
addition, clinical laboratories should have 
an established protocol for notifying clinical 
and/or infection prevention personnel 
when CRE are identified from clinical or 
surveillance cultures. 
Evidence suggests that HCP may use PPE 
incorrectly resulting in contamination 
of their skin and/or clothes. HCP can 
also contaminate themselves during 
doffing if done incorrectly. Facilities 
should ensure that Contact Precautions 
are used correctly by HCP caring for all 
patients with epidemiologically important 
MDROs including CRE. This should 
include ensuring HCP are educated 
about the proper use and rationale for 
Contact Precautions and that they have the 
opportunity to practice donning and doffing 
PPE and to demonstrate competency in 
PPE use before patient contact. In addition, 
facilities should ensure that there is a process 
to monitor and improve HCP adherence 
to Contact Precautions. This might include 
conducting periodic surveillance on the 
use of Contact Precautions and providing 
feedback to frontline staff about these 
results. 
Currently, there is not enough evidence to 
make a firm recommendation about when 
to discontinue use of Contact Precautions 
for infected or colonized patients; however, 
CRE colonization can be prolonged (> 6 
months). If surveillance cultures are used 
to decide if a patient remains colonized, 
more than one culture should be collected 
to improve sensitivity. Regardless of 
whether surveillance cultures are performed, 
the presence of risk factors for ongoing 
carriage or ongoing CRE exposure should 
be considered in the decision about 
discontinuing Contact Precautions. One 
recent study found that among rectal CRE 
carriers, predictors of rectal CRE carriage 
at a future healthcare encounter included 
exposure to antimicrobials, admission 
from another healthcare facility, and less 
than 3 months’ elapsed time since their 
first positive CRE test. The probability of 
being CRE positive at the next encounter 
increased to 50% if one predictor was 
present. 
Empiric Contact Precautions, in 
conjunction with surveillance cultures, 
can be considered for patients transferred 
from high-risk settings pending results 
of screening cultures. Examples include 
transferred patients from hospitals in 
countries or areas of the United States 
where CP-CRE are common or patients 
transferred from facilities known to have 
outbreaks or clusters of CP-CRE colonized 
or infected patients. 
3. Healthcare Personnel Education 
HCP in all settings who care for patients 
with MDROs, including CRE, should be 
educated about preventing transmission of 
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these organisms. At a minimum this should 
education and training on the proper use 
of Contact Precaution. This intervention is 
a fundamental part of infection prevention 
practice and should be applied for all CRE. 
4. Use of Devices 
Use of devices (e.g., central venous catheters, 
endotracheal tubes, and urinary catheters) 
puts patients at risk for device-associated 
infections and minimizing device use is an 
important part of the effort to decrease the 
incidence of these infections. Additionally, 
device use has been associated with the 
presence of CRE. Therefore, minimizing 
device use in all healthcare settings 
should be part of the effort to decrease 
the prevalence of all MDROs, including 
CRE. In acute and long-term care settings, 
device use should be reviewed regularly to 
ensure they are still required and devices 
should be discontinued promptly when 
no longer needed. For more information 
on preventing device-associated infection 
including appropriate use of devices please 
see http://www.cdc.gov/hicpac/BSI/BSI­
guidelines-2011.html and http://www.cdc. 
gov/hicpac/cauti/002_cauti_toc.html. 
This intervention is a fundamental part of 
infection prevention practice and should be 
applied for all CRE. 
5. Laboratory Notification 
Laboratories should have protocols in place 
that facilitate the timely notification (i.e., 
within 4 to 6 hours) of appropriate clinical 
and infection prevention staff whenever 
CRE are identified from clinical and 
surveillance specimens to ensure timely 
implementation of control measures. 
This is true for both facilities with on-site 
laboratories and those sending cultures off-
site and is applicable primarily to all CP­
CRE and any non-CP-CRE that are deemed 
epidemiologically important by the facility. 
6. Inter-facility Communication/ 
Identification of CRE Patients
at Admission 
The presence of CRE infection or 
colonization alone should not preclude 
transfer of a patient from one facility to 
another (e.g., acute care to long-term care). 
However, facilities that are transferring 
patients colonized or infected with CRE 
must notify the receiving facility of the 
patient’s CRE status so that appropriate 
infection prevention measures can be 
promptly implemented upon the patient’s 
arrival. Additional information that might 
be communicated during patient transfers 
include the type and plan for any invasive 
devices that the patient has and the duration 
of any ongoing antimicrobial therapy. An 
example of an inter-facility transfer form 
developed by the Utah Department of 
Health is available at: http://health.utah. 
gov/epi/diseases/HAI/resources/IC_transfer_ 
form.pdf 
In addition, facilities should have a 
mechanism to identify patients previously 
identified as colonized or infected with CRE 
at re-admission so that appropriate infection 
control precautions can be instituted. 
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This intervention is a fundamental part of 
infection prevention practice and should be 
applied for all CRE. 
7. Antimicrobial Stewardship 
Antimicrobial stewardship is another 
primary part of MDRO control and is 
applicable to both acute and long-term 
care settings. Although the role of this 
activity specifically for CRE has not been 
well-studied, multiple antimicrobial classes 
have been shown to be a risk for CRE 
colonization and/or infection. 
As part of an antimicrobial stewardship 
program, facilities should work to ensure 
that antimicrobials are used for appropriate 
indications and duration and that the 
narrowest spectrum antimicrobial that is 
appropriate for the specific clinical scenario 
is used. To assist facilities in this effort, 
CDC has identified core elements that are 
included in successful hospital antimicrobial 
stewardship programs, including 
commitment from facility leadership to 
support antimicrobial stewardship activities, 
designation of appropriate personnel to lead 
the program and provide drug expertise, 
implementation of polices and interventions 
to support optimal antimicrobial use, 
tracking and reporting of antimicrobial 
use and resistance rates, and education on 
optimal antimicrobial prescribing practices. 
Detailed description of these core elements 
is available at http://www.cdc.gov/getsmart/ 
healthcare/pdfs/core-elements.pdf. An 
accompanying checklist that hospitals 
can use to assess whether key policies and 
actions to improve antibiotic use are in 
place can be found at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
getsmart/healthcare/pdfs/checklist.pdf. Both 
these documents and additional information 
on antimicrobial stewardship in healthcare 
settings are available at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
getsmart/healthcare. 
A similar set of resources for antibiotic 
stewardship implementation in nursing 
homes can be found at http://www.cdc.
gov/longtermcare/prevention/antibiotic
-stewardship.html. 
8. Environmental Cleaning 
While, the role of the environment in 
CRE transmission is not completely clear, 
evidence from CRE outbreaks suggests that 
the environment can serve as a source for 
transmission. In order to decrease the risk 
of transmission, facilities should perform 
daily cleaning that include areas in close 
proximity to the patient (e.g., bed rails, 
patient tray) to decrease the burden of 
organisms. In addition, CRE have been 
found in sink drains in patient rooms, 
raising the possibility that equipment and 
patient supplies could become contaminated 
if stored within the zone where splash or 
aerosolization from sinks could occur. 
Surfaces around sinks should be cleaned and 
disinfected regularly and medical equipment 
should not be stored in close proximity to 
sinks. 
Once CRE patients are discharged, terminal 
cleaning of CRE patient rooms should be 
performed. Consideration should be given 
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to monitoring the cleaning process to ensure 
all surfaces are adequately cleaned and 
disinfected. 
This intervention is a fundamental part of 
infection prevention practice and should be 
applied for all CRE. 
9. Patient and Staff Cohorting 
When available, patients colonized or 
infected with any CP-CRE or any non-
CP-CRE judged to be epidemiologically 
important should be housed in single 
patient rooms. In addition, consideration 
should be given to cohorting patients with 
CRE in specific areas (e.g., units or wards), 
even if in single patient rooms, and to using 
dedicated staff (i.e., without responsibility 
for care of non-CRE patients) to care for 
them. At a minimum, dedicated staff should 
include the providers that provide the bulk 
of the patient’s care (e.g., nurses, nursing 
assistants) but could be expanded to include 
other staff (e.g., respiratory therapists) 
particularly if there are a larger number of 
CRE patients or during an outbreak. The 
specific staff that are dedicated may vary 
depending on the healthcare setting. If there 
are an insufficient number of single rooms, 
preference should be given to patients at 
highest risk for transmission such as patients 
with incontinence, medical devices, or 
wounds with uncontrolled drainage. 
This recommendation is not meant to imply 
that one-to-one nursing is required for all 
CRE patients and therefore is generally 
not applicable to facilities with a single 
CRE colonized or infected patient. This 
recommendation might be most applicable 
to CP-CRE, higher prevalence areas, and 
during CRE outbreaks. 
10. Screening Contacts of CRE Patients 
Screening is used to identify unrecognized 
CRE colonization as clinical cultures alone 
will identify only a fraction of all patients 
with CRE. Generally, this testing has 
involved stool, rectal, or peri-rectal cultures 
and sometimes cultures of skin sites, wounds 
or urine (if a urinary catheter is present). 
A laboratory protocol for evaluating 
rectal or peri-rectal swabs for CP-CRE 
is available at (http://www.cdc.gov/HAI/ 
pdfs/labSettings/Klebsiella_or_Ecoli.pdf ). 
Additional non-culture-based tests are also 
becoming available for use in the United 
States that can detect the most common 
carbapenemases. CRE screening includes 
screening epidemiologically-linked contacts 
of newly identified CRE patients and 
active surveillance cultures. The former is 
described in this section while the latter is 
discussed in the following section. 
If previously unrecognized carriers of 
epidemiologically important CRE, including 
CP-CRE, are identified, screening of patient 
contacts should be considered to identify 
transmission. This intervention would be 
most important for CP-CRE. Those patients 
considered contacts may vary from setting 
to setting; however, they usually include 
roommates of the previously unrecognized 
CRE patient. Some facilities may also 
choose to screen patients who might have 
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shared HCP or who were present on the 
ward at the same time. 
Point prevalence surveys might be an 
effective way for facilities to rapidly evaluate 
the prevalence of CRE in particular wards/ 
units and is usually conducted by screening 
all patients present on the unit. This 
approach could be useful in situations where 
a review of clinical cultures using laboratory 
records identifies previously unrecognized 
CRE patients have been housed on certain 
wards/units or to rapidly evaluate for 
additional transmission during an outbreak. 
Point prevalence surveys might be done 
only once if few or no additional CRE 
colonized patients are identified or might 
be done serially if ongoing transmission is 
documented. 
Experience to date suggests that point 
prevalence surveys have generally been 
less likely to identify additional CRE 
patients when performed in response to 
identification of a single CRE patient 
without documented transmission. In these 
situations, due to the time it takes for the 
culture results on the initial CRE patient 
to be finalized and for the survey to be 
arranged, most or all of the patients who 
were present on the ward at the same time 
as the index CRE patient have often been 
discharged. In these situations, screening 
contacts at highest risk for transmission 
(e.g., roommates), even if those patients 
have been discharged or moved to 
another ward, is often of higher yield.  If 
CRE transmission is identified through 
initial contact screening, facilities should 
consider expanding screening (e.g., point 
prevalence survey) to determine the extent 
of transmission and consider conducting 
additional ongoing surveys to document 
that transmission has ceased. 
11. Active Surveillance Testing 
This process involves performing CRE 
screening of patients who might not be 
epidemiologically linked to known CRE 
patients but who meet certain pre-specified 
criteria. This could include everyone 
admitted to the facility, pre-specified high-
risk patients (e.g., those admitted from 
long-term acute-care facilities, patients who 
received medical care in endemic regions), 
and/or patients admitted to high-risk 
settings (e.g., intensive care units [ICUs]). 
This intervention might be more useful in 
areas with higher CP-CRE prevalence and 
during CRE outbreaks. It could also be used 
for non-CP-CRE judged epidemiologically 
important by the facility. Active surveillance 
testing has been used in control efforts for 
several MDROs including CRE; however, in 
these studies, the exact contribution of this 
practice to subsequent decreases in CRE is 
not known. 
As described above, active surveillance 
testing is based on the finding that clinical 
cultures will identify only a minority 
of those patients colonized with CRE; 
unrecognized colonized patients might 
not be on Contact Precautions and are a 
potential source for CRE transmission. 
Surveillance testing strategies can vary 
depending on facility and regional CRE 
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epidemiology. One approach is to focus on 
patients admitted with CRE risk factors 
including overnight stays in healthcare 
facilities in the last six to twelve months. 
Alternatively, testing could target patients 
admitted to high risk settings (e.g., intensive 
care units). This testing is generally done at 
admission but can also be done periodically 
during admission (e.g., weekly). Point 
prevalence surveys could also be used to 
perform periodic surveillance. Patients 
identified as positive by this surveillance 
testing should be treated as colonized (e.g., 
placed on Contact Precautions, etc.). In 
some situations (e.g., patients admitted 
from high-risk settings) patients might be 
placed in empiric Contact Precautions until 
surveillance testing is found to be negative. 
Regardless of whether a larger active 
surveillance program is undertaken, facilities 
should consider performing surveillance 
cultures to rule out CP-CRE in patients 
admitted following an overnight stay within 
the last 6 to 12 months in a healthcare 
facility outside the United States or in an 
area within the Unites States known to have 
a higher prevalence of CP-CRE. If a CRE 
is identified from surveillance or clinical 
cultures from a patient with a history of 
an overnight hospital stay outside the 
United States, the isolate should be sent 
for mechanism testing to evaluate for the 
presence of carbapenemases that are not 
regularly found in the United States. At a 
minimum this should include evaluation 
that would detect KPC, NDM, and OXA­
48-type carbapenemases. This approach 
can help identify patients that harbor CRE 
with novel mechanisms of resistance so 
that further spread of the organism can be 
prevented. 
12. Chlorhexidine Bathing 
Chlorhexidine (CHG) bathing has been 
used successfully to prevent certain types 
of healthcare-associated infections (e.g., 
bloodstream infections) and to decrease 
colonization with certain MDROs, 
primarily in ICUs. For CRE, it has been 
used as part of a multifaceted intervention 
to reduce the prevalence of CRE during 
an outbreak in a long-term acute care 
facility. Chlorhexidine bathing with 2% 
liquid chlorhexidine or 2% chlorhexidine­
impregnated wipes has been used to bathe 
patients (usually daily) while in high-risk 
settings (e.g., ICUs). The chlorhexidine is 
usually not used above the jaw line or on 
open wounds. When chlorhexidine bathing 
is used for a particular patient population or 
in a particular setting, it is usually applied to 
all patients regardless of CRE colonization 
status. Some studies suggest that CHG 
bathing might not always be done 
correctly resulting in suboptimal levels of 
chlorhexidine on the skin. If used, facilities 
should ensure that it is done correctly to 
ensure maximal effect. 
In long-term care settings this type of an 
intervention might be used on targeted 
high-risk residents (e.g., residents that are 
totally dependent upon healthcare personnel 
for activities of daily living, are ventilator-
dependent, are incontinent of stool, or 
have wounds whose drainage is difficult to 
control) or high-risk settings (e.g., ventilator 
unit). 
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This intervention is likely most important 
as part of a plan to control CP-CRE in 
areas of higher prevalence including during 
outbreaks. It could be used for non-CP­
CRE judged epidemiologically important by 
the facility. 
Summary 
A summary of CRE prevention measures is 
included below. 
An approach to the evaluation of newly 
recognized CRE colonized or infected 
patients is shown in Figure 1. 
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Summary of Prevention Strategies 
For Acute and Long-Term Care
Facilities 
Please see text for details. 
1. Hand Hygiene 
•	 Promote hand hygiene 
•	 Monitor hand hygiene adherence 
and provide feedback 
•	 Ensure access to hand hygiene 
stations 
2. Contact Precautions (CP) 
•	 Educate and train healthcare 
personnel about CP including 
allowing time to practice donning 
and doffing 
•	 Monitor CP adherence and provide 
feedback 
•	 No recommendations for 

discontinuation of CP
 
Acute Care 
•	 Place CRE colonized or infected 
patients on Contact Precautions 
(CP) 
º	 Empiric CP might be used for 
patients transferred from high-
risk settings 
Long-term Care 
•	 Place CRE colonized or infected 
residents that are high-risk for 
transmission on CP (as described in 
text); for patients at lower risk for 
transmission use precautions based 
on type of care provided 
3. Healthcare Personnel Education 
4. Minimize Use of Invasive Devices 
5. Timely Notification from Laboratory 
When CRE are Identified 
6. Communication of CRE Status for 
Infected and Colonized Patients at 
Discharge and Transfer 
•	 Identify known CRE patients
at re-admission 
7. Promotion of Antimicrobial Stewardship 
8. Environmental Cleaning 
9. Patient and Staff Cohorting 
•	 When available cohort CRE 
colonized or infected patients and 
the staff that care for them even if 
patients are housed in single rooms 
•	 If the number of single patient 
rooms is limited, reserve these rooms 
for patients with highest risk for 
transmission (e.g., incontinence) 
10. Screening Contacts of CRE Patients 
•	 Screen patient with epidemiologic 
links to unrecognized CRE 
colonized or infected patients 
11. Active Surveillance Testing 
•	 Screen high-risk patients at 
admission or at admission and 
periodically during their facility 
stay for CRE. Empiric CP can be 
considered while results of admission 
surveillance testing are pending 
12. Chlorhexidine Bathing 
•	 Bathe patients with 2% chlorhexidine 
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Figure 1: Facility Approach to Evaluation of Newly
 
Recognized CP-CRE Colonized or Infected Patients
 
New CRE-colonized or CRE-infected patient identified 
t
 
•	 Notify appropriate personnel (i.e., clinical staff, infection prevention staff) 
•	 Notify public health (if required) 
t
 
•	 Place patient on Contact Precautions in single room (if available)-see discussion 
about use in long-term care 
•	 Reinforce hand hygiene and use of Contact Precautions on affected ward/unit 
•	 Educate healthcare personnel caring for patient about preventing CRE 
transmission 
t
 
•	 Consider screening epidemiologically-linked patient contacts (e.g., roommates) 
for CRE with at least stool, rectal, or peri-rectal cultures; consider review
of microbiology records to identify previous cases 
•	 Consider point prevalence survey of affected unit particularly if more than one 
CRE patient identified 
t
 
•	 If screening cultures or further clinical cultures identify additional CRE-
colonized or -infected patients, consider additional surveillance cultures of 
contacts or ongoing point prevalence surveys of affected units until no further 
transmission identified 
•	 Consider admission CRE surveillance cultures (i.e., active surveillance) of high-
risk patients particularly in higher prevalence areas 
•	 Consider cohorting patients and staff 
t 
•	 Ensure if patient transferred within the facility that precautions are continued. 
Ensure, if discharged and readmitted, there is a mechanism to identify patient
at readmission 
•	 Ensure if patient transferred to another facility, CRE status is communicated
to accepting facility 
  
Selected References 
Ben-David D, Maor Y, Keller N, et al. 
Potential role of active surveillance in the 
control of a hospital-wide outbreak of 
carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae
infection. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 
2010; 31:620-6. 
Chea N, Bulens SN, Kongphet-Tran T, et 
al. Improved phenotype-based definition for 
identifying carbapenemase producers among 
CRE. Emerg Infect Dis 2015; 21:1611-6. 
Guh AY, Bulens SN, Mu Y, et al. 
Epidemiology of carbapenem-resistant 
Enterobacteriaceae in 7 US communities, 
2012-2013. JAMA 2015; 314:1479-87. 
Hayden MK, Lin MY, Lolans K, et al. 
Prevention of colonization and infection by 
KPC-producing Enterobacteriaceae in long­
term acute-care hospitals. Clin Infect Dis 
2015; 60:1153-61. 
Kochar S, Sheard T, Sharma R, et al. Success 
of an infection control program to reduce 
the spread of carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella 
pneumoniae. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 
2009; 30:447-52. 
Lin MY, Lolans K, Blom DW, et al. The 
effectiveness of routine daily CHG bathing 
in reducing KPC-producing CRE skin 
burden among long-term acute-care hospital 
patients. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 
2014; 35: 440-2. 
Mody L, Krein SL, Saint S, et al. A targeted 
infection prevention intervention in nursing 
home residents with indwelling devices: a 
randomized clinical trial. JAMA Intern Med 
2015; 175:714-23. 
Munoz-Price LS, Hayden MK, Lolans K, 
et al. Successful control of an outbreak 
of Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase­
producing K. pneumoniae at a long-term 
acute care hospital. Infect Control Hosp 
Epidemiol 2010; 31:341-7. 
Schechner V, Kotlovsky T, Tarabeia J, et al. 
Predictors of rectal carriage of carbapenem­
resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE) among 
patients with known CRE carriage at their 
next hospital encounter. Infect Control 
Hosp Epidemiol 2011; 32:497-503. 
Schwaber MJ, Klarfeld-Lidji S, Navon-
Venezia S, Schwartz D, Leavitt A, Carmeli 
Y. Predictors of carbapenem-resistant 
Klebsiella pneumoniae acquisition among 
hospitalized adults and effect of acquisition 
on mortality. Antimicrob Agents Chemother 
2008; 52:1028-33. 
Schwaber MJ, Lev B, Israeli A, et al. 
Containment of a country-wide outbreak of 
carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae
in Israeli hospitals via a nationally 
implemented intervention. Clin Infect Dis 
2011; 52:848-52. 
19 
20
 

CS261687-A 
